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Sites of Solidarity: Ethnic Belonging 
in Northern Ireland, the Netherlands, 
and a World of Difference
Eleni Zimiles
I. Introduction
Arriving on European soil in August 2007, my perception of glo-
balization was largely comprised of the extensive and intangible tides 
of contemporary macro-institutional forces, such as that of the global 
economy or international governing bodies. Over the course of the 
year, another face of globalization was revealed, one that was a “much 
wider and deeper rendez-vous.”1 I began to more fully comprehend 
globalization as a historically deep conglomeration of overlapping 
global and local processes that affect individuals on an intimate level. 
However, while definitions are indispensably parsimonious, they are 
not sufficient. It is the anthropology student’s role to open these com-
pressed understandings and expose the full details of globalization’s 
universalities and particularities, in effect creating a global “ethnogra-
phy of the particular.”2
This essay is the culmination and product of my participation in 
Macalester College’s Globalization in Comparative Perspective pro-
gram. My intellectual engagement with the particularities of globaliza-
tion focused on the production of ethnic identity and belonging among 
working-class Protestants in Northern Ireland and Somalis in the Neth-
erlands. These communities are situated within the current European 
Union context where, on the one hand, there is the erosion of national 
identity while transforming into an expanded continental “European-
hood,” and, on the other hand, there is the rising of regional nation-
alism, exemplified by the Catalonians and the Jurassians.3 The two 
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ethnographic groups chosen for this study are located somewhere in-
between, reflecting the complexities of membership in Europe. There 
is a constant fluctuation as to whether the Protestants in Northern 
Ireland identify as Northern Irish, British, Ulstermen, Ulster Scots, or 
European. The Somalis living in the Netherlands similarly represent a 
hybrid of affiliations, simultaneously a part of Dutch, Somali, Islamic, 
European, and African society. Intertwined in globalization’s web of 
“overlapping communities of fate,” the individuals in these communi-
ties have intersecting and at times conflicting identities.4
Adding to the list of categories, the Protestants and Somalis belong 
to regions within Europe that are currently enmeshed in varying 
degrees of ethnic and sectarian turmoil. After years of cross-cultural 
violence, the dominant Ulster Protestant community suffers from deep 
political, cultural, and economic fragmentation, leaving working-class 
Protestants isolated and marginalized. The Somalis, who came to the 
Netherlands as refugees, find themselves victimized again, by an envi-
ronment with prolific anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric. This 
essay analyzes how these two groups, in the face of cultural, socio-
economic, and/or political exclusion, foster in-group social solidarity 
through local organizations. Specifically, I examine two youth social 
groups: working-class Protestant flute bands in Belfast and a Somali 
youth organization in The Hague. While often portrayed as passive 
recipients of at-large systemic movements, this study illustrates young 
adults as actively reconstructing cultural structures. The local groups 
the youth participate in are particularly important in that they help 
youth build a positive ethnic identity as well as navigate cross-cul-
tural tensions and discrimination, personal community issues, and 
economic hardships. Ultimately, the goal of this article is to understand 
how ethnic cohesion is actively developed in two localized settings, 
and to draw lessons from these particularities regarding the develop-
ment of global solidarity through cosmopolitanism.
The first section of the essay outlines the overarching concepts. The 
second section analyzes research collected during my fall semester in 
Northern Ireland using two components. First, I historicize the band 
phenomenon within the wider conflict between the Irish Catholics 
and British Protestants, and second, I examine how the bands address 
the needs of young males in their post-conflict, working-class envi-
ronment. The third section is also divided into two parts: a summary 
of the historical and contemporary context of Dutch multiculturalism 
and an analysis of how a Somali youth organization builds cohesion in 
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the face of discrimination and identity confusion. The fourth section 
investigates the wider significance of ethnically defined organizations 
in the encouragement of civic engagement. In light of these cases, the 
essay concludes with a question: Is the expansion of local solidarity a 
plausible path to cosmopolitanism?
II. Delineating a Theoretical Focus
A. Solidarity
Solidarity is not an innate cultural phenomenon, but one that is actively 
constructed. At the heart of my research is the formulation and sig-
nificance of solidarity in upholding a conceptualization of identity. 
Solidarity or cohesion (terms I use interchangeably) is a concept used 
promiscuously throughout anthropology, sociology, and political sci-
ence. My definition relies on Gidden’s characterization of the term, 
which he divides into three dimensions. The first is the psychological, 
understood as a “generalized attitude of care towards others.”5 The sec-
ond, the behavioral dimension, describes a level of “civility” or respect 
individuals within the same environment show one another.6 Third 
is the structural dimension (an elaboration of Durkheim’s “organic 
solidarity”), in which different groups and levels of the community 
are integrated and interdependent.7 Thus, solidarity may be defined as 
the crystallization of care, civility, community integration, and intense 
emotional investment in a group. Understanding solidarity on a local-
ized level, as is the case in these ethnographic studies, is extremely 
relevant in today’s discussions of globalization. As we continue to wit-
ness countless episodes of sectarian violence and ethnic conflict on a 
European and global scale, it is crucial to examine how forms of inclu-
sion are being built within them. At the conclusion of this analysis, I 
will propose some lessons learned from these particularities in regard 
to fostering a global solidarity and a cosmopolitan framework.
B. Prevailing Theories of Global Belonging
Within globalization studies, two theories have predominated in dis-
cussions of globalization’s influence on culture. The “polarization the-
sis” and the “homogenization thesis” are dichotomous reflections on 
globalization and identity politics, providing distinct notions of iden-
tity and its relationship to cultural “otherness.”
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The first theoretical perspective is the polarization thesis, also known 
as differentialism or heterogenization. This viewpoint argues that indi-
viduals are increasingly clinging to singular identity categories, and 
that this provokes greater division and discrimination against those 
with cultural differences.8 The thesis is grounded in an understand-
ing of identity as having an essential nature, made up of fundamental 
and immutable features. Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” 
theory is a prominent example of this position in its classification of 
individuals as falling under a civilizational umbrella, characterized 
according to “common objective elements, such as language, history, 
[and] religion.”9 Globalization’s increasing instances of cross-cultural 
interactions “intensif[ies] civilization consciousness and awareness of 
differences between civilizations and commonalities within [them].”10 
While the “civilizational” terminology is not widely used, the crux of 
Huntington’s argument is crucial to the polarization camp. In other 
words, as dissimilar cultural groups are increasingly in contact with 
one another, differentiation becomes critical, and absolute identities 
become more important to individuals and societies.
The second theoretical perspective regarding cultural reactions to 
globalization is the homogenization thesis, or a “convergence toward 
a common set of cultural traits and practices.”11 While the previous 
thesis conceptualized cultural characteristics as indisputable identity 
fixtures, homogenization theorists regard localized cultural differ-
ences as tenuous, at the beck-and-call of macro-institutional influences. 
Within this camp is Ritzer, who popularized the “McDonaldization 
Thesis,” arguing that local ethnic differences are overwritten by West-
ern, especially American, culture through the economic and media 
influences of transnational corporations.12 A variant of the homogeni-
zation theory has been argued by Appadurai, who shows how cultural 
“cores” (including non-Western powers) eradicate the local character 
of their “peripheries.”13 International standardization is at the crux of 
the homogenization perspective.
Outlining these theories is not meant to be an endorsement of either, 
but as points of reference for further analysis of the ethnographic por-
tion of this essay pertaining to conceptions of identity and cultural 
relationships. While the polarization and homogenization theses are 
engaging reflections on the adaptation of cultural identity when con-
fronted by difference, they are ultimately unsatisfying in illuminat-
ing the dynamics of belonging and communal empathy in imagined 
cultural communities. These perspectives concentrate on discerning a 
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“unifying conception of society and transformation,” but do not pro-
vide a “workable sense of cohesion.”14
III. Research from the Fall Semester in Northern Ireland: 
“The bands, now that’s our religion”
On any given Saturday in the city of Belfast in Northern Ireland, drum 
blasts from the Ulster blood and thunder flute bands can be heard slap-
ping sidewalks and bouncing off the graffiti covered “peace walls.” A 
cultural tradition for the working-class Ulster Protestant community, 
the bands stir particularly passionate responses from all the city’s citi-
zens.15 Many in the Irish Catholic neighborhoods angrily denounce 
the bands as disrespecting private space, and middle to upper class 
Protestants see the bands as “perpetuating unwanted conflict.” How-
ever, within the working-class Protestant communities themselves the 
bands are seen as a fixture of their ethnic identity.
This section is the product of my attendance at numerous band 
practices, parades, and competitions; my conversations with both band 
directors and members; and interviews over tea and biscuits with com-
munity members and local organizers. My analysis discusses how the 
bands in the Shankill neighborhood of Belfast cultivate solidarity for 
young males, ages 15 to 25, and help them cope with their community’s 
social, political, and economic exclusion from the wider society. First, 
I will give a background to the historical context of the band phenom-
enon. Second, using the concept of an embodied ideology, I will show 
how the bands build community by addressing material and cultural 
identity needs. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
bands’ social impact, the wide-ranging cultural phenomenon of bands 
and parading must be examined in relation to the extensive marginal-
ization of working-class Protestant youth.
A. Historical and Contemporary Context
1. The Bands and the Cultural Divide
The band phenomenon is a key thread within the Ulster Protestant 
historical and cultural fabric. Ulster Protestants are descendants of a 
group of settlers from England and Scotland sent by King Henry VIII 
in the early 1500s. Their assignment was to convert the Irish to Prot-
estantism through the occupation of land in Ireland. Although they 
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were connected to the ruling British culture and society, the Protestants 
remained a minority in a predominantly Catholic Ireland. In 1921, Ire-
land was divided. The Protestants were now the majority in Northern 
Ireland, but remained in the cultural periphery of Great Britain.
The origin of these bands can be attributed to the Orange Order’s 
tradition of parading. A Protestant organization loyal to the British 
sovereign, the Orange Order was established in 1795 in Ulster County 
with the purpose of protecting the civil and religious liberties of the 
Protestant people.16 Initially, the Order began to parade on the streets 
demonstrating for civil and religious rights, as well as for commemora-
tion of past Protestant victories, most notably, “King Billy’s” defeat of 
King James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.17 Musical accompani-
ment was gradually added to the parades, and by the 1870s bands of 
at least 20 musicians were marching with the Order.18 In the 1950s, 
several bands broke away from the Orange lodges and started to inde-
pendently recruit members, handle finances, and eventually hold their 
own parades. Bryan and Jarmen note, “The bands offer[ed] an alterna-
tive, less official, social network [than the Orange Order], and their 
involvement in parades is in many senses more ‘active.’ ”19 To this day, 
the large majority of bands are independent, with only a few bands 
formed out of local Orange lodges.
With the onset of the Troubles in the late 1960s, when the Catholic 
civil rights movement began, bands evolved into vehicles for politi-
cal demonstrations. Deprived working-class Protestants felt threat-
ened by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign, which had turned 
from peaceful protests to violent guerrilla warfare. In response, young 
men gathered to form loyalist paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster 
Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). As 
an alternative outlet to the paramilitaries for expressing their griev-
ances, working-class youth joined flute bands in droves. In the 1970s, 
“blood and thunder” flute bands emerged, separating from the clas-
sic melody flute band. They quickly became the most popular type of 
band. “We play the tunes the loudest and the best,” one band mem-
ber explained; “we have thunder in the noise of the drum, and blood 
because when the bass drummer plays, he plays until his hands bleed.” 
The bands were linked to the paramilitaries during the Troubles, some 
acting as recruiting devices for the vigilante groups, others simply 
wearing paramilitary insignia during parades. However, now the two 
are clearly recognized as distinct organizations.
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In the aftermath of the Troubles and the Belfast/Good Friday Agree-
ment in 1998, the bands have encountered greater amounts of negative 
press, but have also increased dramatically in membership, particu-
larly in the working-class urban neighborhoods. In the 1990s, several 
controversies arose regarding certain Orange Order parades and their 
marching routes, which not only led to increased restrictions for gen-
eral band parades, but also augmented a negative reputation for the 
bands as confrontational and sectarian. However, this has not stopped 
the bands’ growing popularity. Today there are an estimated 630 Prot-
estant marching bands in Northern Ireland.20 This is noteworthy con-
sidering there are at least 20 members of each band (and sometimes 
almost 200), which calculates to about 13,000 to 32,000 band members 
in Northern Ireland out of a total population of 1.7 million. Bands prac-
tice year round, preparing for the marching season from April to Sep-
tember, when they march Friday and Saturday nights and generally 
the whole week of the 12th of July, called “the Twelfth.” The Twelfth is 
the climax of the season, when the entire community makes a united 
pilgrimage to the central field in Belfast for a loud, drunken, and bois-
terous celebration of Unionism and the victory of Protestantism at the 
Battle of the Boyne.
While the bands are intertwined in the historical division between 
the Irish Catholics and British Protestants, they are also a current 
expression of the fragmentation of the at-large Protestant community. 
The socioeconomic classes are entirely geographically isolated from 
one another. While “united in their broad aims—to retain the union 
and prevent its erosion”—the party politics of Protestant Northern Ire-
land largely reflects the class divisions.21 Culturally, there is no coher-
ent ethnic narrative, as different levels of society identify with varying 
historical markers or affiliations, such as working-class Protestants 
identifying strongly with Great Britain, versus those from the upper 
class with Northern Ireland. The Protestants often fail to find appro-
priate avenues to express their needs. In contrast, the united Catho-
lic population politicized its grievances and achieved the ability to 
articulate them to the government and to the wider international pub-
lic. The working class often feels the brunt of their ethnicity’s expres-
sive incapacity. Frequently attacked in the media, many working-class 
Protestants express feelings of resentment toward their seemingly 
constant adaptation to Catholic needs. Alienated from a middle class 
that might otherwise represent them, feelings of shame and aggres-
sion arise from these feelings of inarticulation and marginalization. 
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The Protestant “siege mentality,” or constant fearfulness of defeat by 
Catholicism, is evident in most conversations about cross-cultural rela-
tions.22 Undoubtedly, this attitude is attached to their insecurity in 
expressing a concrete, shared identity, or what McKay describes as the 
“gaping hole” in Protestant identity.23 When there is an opportunity to 
identify themselves, it is generally through the negation of the Catholic 
perspective, i.e., “I don’t know who I am, but I know I am not Catho-
lic.” The bands are thus the working-class Protestant’s central medium 
of taking ownership of a “positive identity.”24 The bands provide the 
community with a means to represent a culture on its own—a culture 
with a distinctive history and array of symbols.
2. Situating the “Blood and Thunder” on the Shankill
My research was located in the Shankill neighborhood of working-
class West Belfast, an area marked by its past and present poverty 
and violence. In the 19th century, the Shankill benefited from a wave 
of economic and technological globalization and was an industrial 
center with substantial textile and shipyard factories. After the World 
Wars a long movement of de-industrialization left many unemployed 
and impoverished. As the global economy shifted, both textiles and 
shipbuilding moved to other continents. The onset of the Troubles in 
the 1960s caused further erosion of the community. Sitting adjacent to 
the Catholic Falls neighborhood, but separated by a 25-foot tall “peace 
wall,” the Shankill was the focal point for violent attacks from the IRA, 
including open gunfire confrontations and bombings of local shops.
Today, it is a noticeably deprived area of Belfast. Walking down 
the Shankill Road, the central shopping strip and meeting place for 
neighborhood residents, one witnesses shops boarded up and cov-
ered with paramilitary graffiti, and empty lots filled with plastic bags, 
broken glass, and cigarette butts. Young women push baby strollers 
past the hovering murals of masked men with machine guns. Groups 
of young men, marked by their cut-up faces, gold chains, and gelled 
hair, gather around cars, smoking long cigarettes. Youth unemploy-
ment and anti-social behavior runs high. A youth worker at a local 
social justice agency explained to me that, “jobs used to be ensured at 
the shipyards, so education wasn’t a priority, and these values haven’t 
changed since.” The residential layout of the neighborhood has dete-
riorated in the last decade. During “The Feud” in the summer of 2000, 
the two rival paramilitary organizations, the UDA and UVF, went on a 
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killing rampage in the community. Many people were forced to move 
out of their homes and never returned. This displacement of Shankill 
residents has left large sections of the area deserted. The Shankill’s 
unique post-Troubles circumstances add to the deprivation. Gillespie 
describes how West Belfast’s previous involvement in the conflict led 
to the current “corrosion of the traditional working class neighborhood 
and all that went with it: a sense of belonging, capacity for common 
action, a high degree of face to face interaction, [and] shared goals and 
interdependence.”25 This context makes the community-building role 
of the bands particularly significant. Ultimately, the youth experience 
in the bands must be viewed in the context of these two intersecting 
spheres: the intercultural conflict between Ulster Protestants and Irish 
Catholics, and the deprivation in the working-class Shankill commu-
nity.
B. Addressing Socio-Cultural and Identity Needs
In Acts of Union: Youth and Sectarian Culture in Northern Ireland, Des-
mond Bell raises the question: “To what extent [does] this ‘culture 
work’ [i.e., the bands and parading] represent an autonomous gen-
erational response to the material problems facing the young them-
selves?”26 Or, we can ask, is it that the “culture work” allows the youth 
to more actively address the socio-historical traditions of earlier gen-
erations? The fulfillment of both socio-cultural and affiliation needs is 
significant in understanding how the bands provide the young men 
with a vehicle for building a cohesive community structure in the face 
of financial and psychological marginalization.
1. The Bands and the Family
The bands are integral in assisting young Protestant males to tackle 
social deficiencies and problems associated with being part of a post-
conflict, de-industrialized working-class community. They do this pri-
marily in two different ways: constructing a multigenerational male 
network, and “keeping kids off the street” through the provision of 
leadership roles and responsibilities. In a society with crumbling fam-
ily structures, the bands provide young men with membership in a 
multigenerational male network. Traditionally, a young boy would join 
the band of his father, and these long lines of paternal legacy are still 
apparent in many of the older bands. Today, young men still cite their 
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relatives’ membership as a primary motivation for joining, although 
it is no longer focused on the father’s affiliation, but often through an 
older cousin, uncle, or maternal grandfather. “Families are now ripped 
apart,” the minister at the Shankill’s Presbyterian Church explained at 
a busy café; “a good example there, the fellow over there has kids with 
about four different women.”
During the Shankill’s golden industrial age, families had many chil-
dren and lived in tight proximity to one other. After several redevelop-
ment projects and, more recently, the Shankill Feud, many houses are 
uninhabited and families are increasingly isolated. The combination 
of rising teen pregnancies and abandoned residences has left many 
young men growing up without father figures. Each band has its own 
small group of older males, in particular those who fill the roles of 
band director, manager, and secretary. Joining reconnects many young 
adults with older male relatives or role models. For many, the bands 
become contemporary family replacements. “The band is family,” one 
band director described passionately. At competitions, a band will rent 
out a bar hall and invite other bands to compete. Seats will be filled by 
local older men who come to cheer on the bands and share wisecracks 
with the musicians during breaks. This is a valuable opportunity for 
young men to connect with, and gain acceptance and approval from, 
the senior generations of their community.
2. Community Engagement and Respect
Growing up on the Shankill, where future prospects eternally look 
slim, young men who would otherwise be regarded as negligent and 
reckless kids, when seen participating in a band are granted highly val-
ued respect from community members and simultaneously gain much 
needed self-confidence. With job opportunities difficult to obtain, many 
young people fall into anti-social behavior, often joining the paramili-
tary groups who after the Troubles took over the drug rings in the 
area. Gillespie summarizes the conundrum facing many working-class 
males: “The crucial problems concerning adults are those associated 
with growing towards maturity in an environment where many of the 
expectations (having money, freedom, power, etc.) and responsibilities 
(steady job, house, etc.) of being mature will be denied.”27 Several older 
community members described youth on the Shankill as “those drunk-
ard fellows.” However, when recognized as a band member, their 
language and countenance immediately changes, and the males are 
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regarded as respectable neighbors. One Shankill band alumni recalled 
a lead drummer he had seen at a parade the previous weekend: “When 
I saw that fellow carrying that band’s flag, whew he was stiff as a rod. 
But let me tell you, I’d see him back then day in and day out slouching 
over a drink at the Royal [local pub].” The transformations of the band 
members are particularly powerful. In an area where the political and 
social structures have largely let the youth down, respect is the most 
many of the young men can ask for from their community, and they 
are granted this through their band membership. “The band gives you 
the opportunity to be someone,” a Shankill minister told me; “it gives 
you credibility and authority.”
To counteract the anti-social behavior that many young adults fall 
into in the Shankill, band directors assign leadership positions to 
younger members. One informant was given his position as vice-band 
captain over the flute section in his band at sixteen years old. He said 
that the responsibilities he had, which included giving music lessons 
to younger members, coordinating with the drum section, and main-
taining high morale, kept him out of the drug circles that many of 
his friends who weren’t in bands fell into. Part of placing band mem-
bers into a leadership hierarchy is an effort to foster an atmosphere 
of respect and trust between members and generations. “We need to 
show each other as band members that we appreciate each other,” one 
director said.
3. Boundary Maintenance
A primary mission of the bands is to identify who they are in relation 
to their space. As different areas are taken over by development proj-
ects or new immigrants, the Protestants use the parades to demarcate 
their history and a localized foundation for their identity. The band 
literally maps its territory by marching—“inscribing an identity into 
the physical geography and reconnecting the fragmented parts into 
an idealized whole.”28 A young ex-prisoner recently started a band at 
the farthest end of the upper Shankill, a place where many people had 
started to leave, when he realized that there was a need to represent 
that area and “remember that it’s Protestant.” At the interface area 
where the opening of the gate between the Shankill and the Falls road 
meet and where most acts of violence still occur, the band is the lifeline 
to the Protestant area. The band of this section is particularly important 
because with them, “it’s not just the band that won’t exist, it’s our whole 
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community,” one band member told me. The bands are seen by many 
to hold the last remnants of a unified Protestant identity. “This, it’s 
our culture,” a band secretary said at a competition as he watched his 
rivals, “this is grassroots loyalism moving up.” Many outsiders regard 
the bands as controversial entities, citing that their historical routes 
disregard new demographics (i.e., Catholic residences) and impose 
sectarianism. However, Bell notes that while the bands “function to 
sustain localistic loyalties rather than generate mere hostility to recog-
nized outsiders…[the bands are] concerned with the collective desire 
to identify and celebrate the ‘same’ rather than purely ‘telling the dif-
ference.’ ”29 This is an important distinction to make. The bands do 
spend a majority of the time with each other in their own local areas, 
but their infrequent public marches gain the most media recognition, 
and thus produce controversy.
4. Creating a Protestant Network
Bands build an extensive community network between working-class 
Protestant neighborhoods around the city and throughout Northern 
Ireland. This is highly visible with the band competitions, which go on 
throughout the year, either on streets or in social clubs. These are social 
events in which the hosting band raises money by inviting other bands 
to their club or neighborhood. Visiting bands bring their girlfriends 
and buy drinks at the host club, all partaking in a larger movement 
of reciprocity. Though the bands are often only competing for small 
trophies rating their skills in marching, appearance, and musician-
ship, their participation helps build a reputation as well as encourage 
bands to go to others’ parades and competitions. Bands also make a 
point to travel outside of their own neighborhood, some making their 
way as far as Scotland and Liverpool. Another band member talked to 
me about how one of the best parts of being in the band was meeting 
new people and visiting new places, both opportunities that are not 
necessarily open to him and his peers on a normal basis. Young band 
members are revamping this tradition through the new capabilities 
of the Internet. Networking sites, such as Bebo and MySpace, have 
turned into a central strategic tactic for communicating with other 
bands and musicians in order to keep in touch, share parade videos, 
and invite others to band competitions and parades. Many bands also 
have websites where they can explain their histories and events. As 
bands intermingle and make their way through each other’s neighbor-
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hoods, social cohesion among the working-class populations of Belfast 
is augmented, and an emotional sense of solidarity is fostered.
5. Marching Forward
Today on the Shankill, as the paramilitaries have lost popular support 
and legitimacy, the bands have become the primary means of Protes-
tant cultural expression, shifting the emphasis from a culture that must 
show its loyalty to one another through defending against rival com-
munities, to one that celebrates cultural identity and heritage. Several 
bands are attempting to “start anew” and become a serious musical 
activity with wider community support. One step is to completely dis-
connect from paramilitary affiliations. One drummer talked about his 
band’s new rules: “no one can talk about the UVF, UDA, UFF [Ulster 
Freedom Fighters], YCV [Young Citizen Volunteers], Red Hands. Once 
you step into that door you can’t say a word, none of that, and if you 
got a tattoo somewhere with one of ’em, you cover that up as well.” 
Paramilitaries had symbolized the obligation Protestants had to defend 
their community (through violent means if necessary). De-emphasizing 
the connections the youth have to these vigilante groups has nurtured 
a new atmosphere for the bands. Many bands have also prohibited 
the tradition of drinking alcohol before the parades and competitions, 
providing the bands with a more respectable image. Furthermore, in 
a symbolic gesture to “break barriers,” one band “put out an official 
statement challenging any Nationalist band on the Falls to a band com-
petition.” The focus of many bands has now turned to emphasizing 
pride in one’s culture and heritage. As an example, one group of band 
members mentioned learning about King Billy’s philosophy of spread-
ing democracy, and took pride in this historical artifact. With these 
adjustments, the bands are working towards a revitalized image, one 
that celebrates ethnic identity instead of aggressively guarding it.
In 1995, Ian Paisley, during his time as the First Minister of Northern 
Ireland, said, “The Right of the Protestant People to march…lies at the 
very heart…and very foundation of the future of our families.”30 As 
they actively construct social cohesion in the Shankill community, the 
Northern Irish flute bands have become a symbol of Protestant unity. 
While the controversies during the 1990s, leading to the formation of 
the Parades Commission in 1997, revolved around accusations about 
their anti-Catholic nature and provocation of sectarianism, my analysis 
of the bands shows a different picture. The bands still contain some 
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divisive “us against them” elements, exemplified in the genre of “Kick-
the-Pope” tunes. However, they now carry a much more significant 
social purpose, in many ways transcending the conflict and providing 
a response to the community’s inarticulacy, economic exclusion, and 
political fragmentation.
IV. The Netherlands: Research from the Spring Semester
“I’ll wear my orange underwear—you know, Dutch on the inside, 
Somali on the outside.”
Turning away from Northern Ireland, this section of the essay dis-
cusses how a Somali organization cultivates belonging among young 
Dutch citizens who are first- and second-generation refugees from 
Somalia. This analysis was developed from research collected dur-
ing my second semester, studying in the antique city of Maastricht 
at the southern tip of the Netherlands. Due to issues of distance and 
accessibility, the research process did not include the level of partici-
pant-observation of the fall semester. My information was gathered 
from a combination of interviews with a handful of Somali university 
students and other Muslim students in various areas of the country, a 
wide literature review, and lectures held at the Universiteit Maastricht. 
This section is divided into two major parts. The first discusses the 
Dutch “multiculturalist” society and, more specifically, its relationship 
to Islamic migrant populations. The second analyzes a Somali youth 
organization and how it functions to build solidarity through address-
ing social anxieties and frustrations.
A. Historical and Contemporary Context
1. A Brief History of Dutch Multiculturalism
In contemporary Dutch society the presence of a growing Muslim pop-
ulation is raising numerous debates regarding the meaning of national 
identity, multiculturalism, and the integration of ethnic minorities. The 
Netherlands historically has the liberal reputation of holding religious 
tolerance and freedom as prioritized values. Beginning with the revolt 
against Spanish rule in the 16th century and confirmed again in the 
17th century with the welcoming of Portuguese Jews and the Hugue-
nots from France, the Dutch Republic was known as a safe haven for 
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those with differing religious beliefs.31 At the end of the 19th century, 
the “Pillarization” system was established giving “religious groups 
the right to establish their own infrastructures on the basis of their 
ideologies and to be subsidized by the government.”32 The implemen-
tation of political consociationalism institutionally divided civil soci-
ety. One’s neighborhood, school, television channels, politicians, and 
services were all organized under the pillars. This stimulated the belief 
that multiculturalism was cultural compromise, a “separate but equal” 
diversity.33
Problems with the Dutch pillarization system and multiculturalism 
arose in the 1960s, with the arrival of large numbers of gastarbeiders, 
or guest workers, from Morocco, Turkey, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The 
Dutch government assumed that this population influx was tempo-
rary. To support a liberal, multicultural agenda the Dutch promoted 
cultural preservation among these minorities, discouraging Dutch lan-
guage education and advocating separate cultural organizations and 
education in order to maintain their indigenous identities and tradi-
tions. Even though the pillarization structure was beginning to receive 
criticism during this time, the attitude and actions taken toward these 
minorities was distinctly in line with the pillar framework. With an 
additional wave of asylum seekers, largely from Somalia and Iran, 
it gradually came to be seen that many of these minorities were not 
returning to their original countries, but were becoming a permanent 
appendage to Dutch society.34 Many within the Dutch population felt 
particularly unsettled by the new Muslim migrants, whose religious 
culture was foreign and seemingly incompatible with Dutch liberal-
ism. In a series of legislation, including the Minorities Memorandum 
in 1983, the 1994 Equal Treatment Act, and the 1998 Act for Stimula-
tion of Labour Market Participation, the Dutch government attempted 
to find an appropriate environment for immigrants and particularly 
Muslims. These actions elaborated on the belief that, “the government 
should not interfere with the identity expressions of these [minority] 
groups…and that minority groups had the same rights as other ‘iden-
tity groups’ in obtaining public subsidies for broadcasting, education 
and other welfare activities.”35 In effect, a fifth pillar was formed, giv-
ing Muslim immigrants their own religious communities. The assump-
tion was that if Muslims were given their own space, free from any 
criticism, they would eventually integrate into the Dutch political sys-
tem and society.36
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Contemporary discussions of multiculturalism shifted after Septem-
ber 11, 2001, as well as the murders of two major Dutch public figures, 
Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Theo Van Gogh (2004), which “laid bare the 
fissures in Dutch society.”37 Both were populist personalities and vocif-
erously expressed their anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant views. They 
argued that Dutch liberalism was threatened by the growing “intoler-
ant” and “backward” Islamic communities.38 Their murders caused 
deep-set public agitation, seen as prophecies of the close-to-home dan-
gers of Islamic extremism (even though Fortuyn was murdered by a 
non-Muslim Dutch animal-rights activist). Today several right-wing 
politicians, most notably Geert Wilders and Rita Verdonk, have com-
menced with campaigns to “Stop the Islamization of the Netherlands,” 
hoping to move the Dutch away from their tendency to, “out of fear 
for Muslim indignation about certain things, succumb to expected 
demands of respect and willing[ly] put aside its own values.”39 These 
movements have encouraged the current climate of assimilationism, 
advocating a “forced integration” for Dutch Muslims into supposed 
Dutch “Enlightenment” standards.
2. Immigrant and Muslim Associationalism
While there is rising anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment in the 
Netherlands (as well as in wider Europe), at the same time more immi-
grants and “new Dutch” citizens are forming self-represented civic 
groups.40 The wave of Muslim and national associations was originally 
initiated due to local governments failing to provide appropriate inte-
grative policies for immigrants when it was realized that they were 
no longer temporary guest workers and were officially “moving in.” 
Without any political intervention to create a landscape of respect and 
recognition for the new additions to local society, Muslims began to 
organize into civic groups, either by nationality or under a general 
Islamic banner, in order to establish unified representation, address 
large social concerns, and integrate into the local political and social 
life. This new trend of associationalism promotes “a shared narra-
tive based upon secularized Islamic value systems,” providing a sense 
of cohesion for the diverse Muslim populations within the country.41 
These organizations also address the social needs and integration 
issues of individual communities in a hostile environment. One sector 
of this large movement is the growing popularity of student groups 
and organizations devoted to representing and integrating Muslim 
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youth, particularly those who are the second- and third-generations 
of immigrant families. Alongside criticism of the pillar system, these 
groups have come under some negative scrutiny, seen as hindering full 
integration and appreciation for Dutch liberal values.
This study will focus on one anonymous Somali youth organiza-
tion, an insightful example of a migrant organization that was estab-
lished to facilitate the integration of young Somalis into Dutch culture. 
With a total population of 20,000, Somalis are one of the largest refu-
gee groups in the Netherlands. Somalis first started coming into the 
Netherlands as refugees in the early 1990s, fleeing from civil war. The 
Somali revolution that led to the destruction of the Siad Barre regime 
in 1991 turned into a civil war that continues to this day. Thousands 
of individuals and families left for Northern Europe, the Middle East, 
and the United States. In the Netherlands, most of the Somali popula-
tion is centered in The Hague and Rotterdam.
The Somali organization was founded in 1996 by a group of young 
Somali men who felt disillusioned by the lack of Somali organizational 
representation and by how the Dutch Somali diaspora was becoming 
increasingly segregated according to the traditional family clan struc-
ture. The organization is part of a larger Somali foundation, which 
includes a youth component, a Somali radio station, and a capacity 
building sector. Located in The Hague, home to several international 
governing bodies and a particularly multicultural population, the 
Somali organization has had to battle discrimination and integration 
difficulties.
The Somalis have a unique position in the Netherlands and thus 
have distinct experiences to confront. Most significantly, Somalis did 
not come to the Netherlands as guest workers, but as refugees. As 
East Africans, the Somalis have a racial and physical distinction from 
Moroccans or Turks, the two largest ethnic Muslim populations in the 
Netherlands. Many of the Somalis who came to the Netherlands early 
in the 1990s, compared to those who came later, were well educated 
and many came from privileged socioeconomic classes in Somalia. 
The youth members who I interviewed had arrived with their families 
as toddlers in the early 1990s. Their families are largely well edu-
cated and of higher socioeconomic status. All of them were currently 
enrolled in a university in The Hague, Rotterdam, or Utrecht. The 
following section will show how the organization builds solidarity by 
addressing three main sources of exclusion: the experiences of duality, 
discrimination, and misrepresentation. The analysis reveals that the 
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Somali organization does not support a Dutch “Clash of Civilizations” 
concept, but is working toward something much larger and more cul-
turally significant.
B. Addressing Socio-Cultural and Identity Needs
1. Fostering Fluidity
The primary source of frustration and distress for many Somali youth 
is negotiating between their “dual-lives;” between their investment in 
Somalia and the Somali culture shown to them by their parents, and 
their identification with and personal experiences growing up in Dutch 
society. While many young first- and second-generation immigrants 
are often accused of having split loyalties between two countries, the 
Somali experience is more nuanced. While each individual assured me 
of their “Somali-ness,” frequently stating, “I am Somali,” many con-
fessed that if they went to or returned to Somalia, they probably would 
not feel “at home.” This separates them, sometimes in unsettling ways, 
from their parents’ generation. One friend of the organization proudly 
described the Somali people as “the most nationalist people in Africa,” 
and said that the first generation that arrived in the Netherlands “didn’t 
come here to stay—they live here, but someday all have to go back.” 
Yet later, when referring to his own tentative plans to go to Somalia, he 
recalled an experience abroad: “I went to Italy for school, and while I 
was there, I missed Holland. I really missed it.” He continued to admit, 
“I’m not going to exclude the fact that I’m Dutch when I go back to 
Somalia.” These sentiments correspond to the perception that ethnic 
affiliation is not necessarily tied to territory. Anthropologist Ghorashi’s 
theoretical analysis of the diasporic experience describes this as a “ter-
ritorial approach in which identity is directly related to ‘origin’ and 
thus to ‘roots’…an essentialist understanding of identity [that] does 
not hold.”42 Ghorashi’s point connects to the realization of many young 
Somalis that they have a tenuous connection to the physical reality of 
Somalia, but they do have a very strong idea of Somalia and a sense of 
belongingness to it.
Furthermore, the Somali youth expressed personal turmoil between 
their experiences in their homes and outside, negotiating Somali and 
Dutch cultural standards. One girl described the confusion that comes 
along with confrontations of two cultures: “It happens with everything, 
it’s the littlest things—like if I was to bring someone to my house, they 
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have to take their shoes off and they wouldn’t know, or I’d have to 
explain the smells in my house.” Having to navigate between the daily 
realities within their homes and schools can become a schizophrenic-
like existence. Buruma’s Murder in Amsterdam asserts that schizophre-
nia is a problem that second-generation European Muslims potentially 
face: “the problem lies in the adaptation of a strictly regulated society 
to a freer, more open one.”43 Many of the Somali youth did express 
differences in expectations between their parents and non-Somalis or 
non-Muslims, one example being who and when to marry. Most feel 
torn between these perspectives, having a comprehension of both, yet 
feeling unsure of how to define their own expectations. With everyday 
confrontations between their varying ethnic affiliations, these dilem-
mas can cause deep personal confusion. At times, if not dealt with, it 
can lead to a complete denunciation of one culture or the other.
The Somali organization confronts the difficulties that the Somali 
youth experience by encouraging a fluid cultural identity. This is 
achieved through the active creation of a safe space for dialogue and 
peer collaboration. The mission of the organization, as stated on its 
website, is: “to facilitate the integration of the Somali community in the 
Dutch society, while maintaining the Somali culture.” A central aspect 
of the youth project is to use discussion and debate to go over issues 
that are not easily negotiated between Dutch and Somali culture. The 
organization schedules a collection of meetings, which were described 
as having “a very comfortable environment, something we don’t often 
get.” “There are experiences we have and maybe don’t understand, 
which we don’t even think of discussing until we’re together,” one 
male student described. Topics generally involve concerns regarding 
cultural norms. Female circumcision is a subject often discussed and 
debated, primarily because it is one of the most contentious within 
Dutch society. This is a pertinent example, as it is something the stu-
dents generally do not advocate or necessarily agree with, although 
many found the dialogue surrounding the organization’s debate 
enlightening because it involved taking a critical look at both sides. 
This is particularly significant in that the organization supports a level 
of self-criticism as well as critical adaptation through open discussion.
In the same vein, the organization endeavors to overcome the 
cultural duality felt by many of the youth through fostering more 
meaningful and deeper investments in both Dutch and Somali society. 
Ghorashi’s comments on immigrant communities’ relationship to the 
country of origin, noting that what matters is:
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how [the immigrants’ background] is imagined and constructed to serve 
as a source of belonging that goes beyond the notion of a nation-state. In 
other words, a ‘place of origin’ here is not a taken for granted point of 
departure, but is merely a point of reference that is helpful in the process 
of the construction of multiple identifications.44
The organization puts a strong emphasis on learning about the 
situation in Somalia and encourages the active promotion of peace 
and reconciliation. At the same time, the young adults recognize that 
the more they learn about Somalia, the more they see the difference 
between their parents’ “homeland” and the Netherlands. This compar-
ative process gradually complicates the youths’ attachment to Somalia 
as “home.” A group of students went with the organization on a trip 
to the Somaliland region and met with many Somalis of the same age. 
One female student spoke about the trip as a stark realization of the 
differences between Somali youth in Europe and those back in Africa. 
However, it was also apparent that the trip didn’t diminish her own 
identification with the culture, but allowed for a new sense of a shared 
cultural identity: being a Somali can take different forms. Many of the 
discussions and debates deal with this awareness of fluidity; between 
being from Somalia, living in the Netherlands, and feeling that “home” 
is somewhere in-between. One of the directors of the organization, 
when questioned about his own feelings of fluidity, said, “I’m Dutch, 
Somali, black, Muslim, and African; we need to start thinking like 
this.”
2. Transcending Discrimination
A second frustration expressed by the Somali youth and addressed 
by the organization is the discrimination directed towards them as 
“allochtoon.” Meaning “originating from another country,” Essed and 
Trieneken describe the beginning of the popular usage of allochtoon 
as dating back to the 1994 Equal Treatment Act, a definition used to 
“include residents born elsewhere, as well as their children, even when 
born in the Netherlands and even when one parent was born in the 
Netherlands as well.”45 This word, alongside its opposite, or “autoch-
toon,” defined as “originating from this country,” “captures the mix of 
racial thinking and cultural hierarchies.”46 This is significant because 
a more nuanced understanding of inclusion within the wider Somali 
culture and diaspora is successfully advocated by the organization, but 
Eleni Zimiles
267
the same has not been achieved with the youth’s Dutch identity due to 
externally influenced sentiments of social exclusion. A majority of the 
Somalis informants were uncomfortable with positively identifying 
themselves as Dutch. “I don’t see myself as Dutch,” one girl told me, 
“when I think of Dutch, I think blonde, blue eyes.” However, an older 
member of the organization argued that this reaction was in response 
to the populist Dutch attitude, which separates those of a Dutch ori-
gin and those deemed foreigners (symbolized by the term allochtoon). 
Many of the students brought up this linguistic form of exclusion, a 
word they couldn’t seem to shake off. Several of the males linked this 
term with the discrimination they felt in regard to finding jobs. For 
example, one who said that they could tell by his last name that he was 
allochtoon, and for that he felt he was not given an equal opportunity.
In efforts to defeat feelings of social exclusion and racism, the Somali 
organization has promoted the inclusion of young adults within the 
wider European Somali diaspora in order to involve them in a greater 
network of social mobility. Instead of countering discrimination by 
creating greater engagement with Dutch identity, the organization pro-
motes feeling a sense of opportunity as a Somali migrant. A female stu-
dent talked about a trip with the organization to Sweden where, “we 
met with these very successful Somalis in Sweden, to see what Somalis 
are doing in Europe.” By exposing the students to fellow Somalis who 
have “made it,” they are inspiring them to work hard and take advan-
tage of the opportunities that are available in Europe. All of the Somali 
students spoken to were of middle class status, and this is an important 
characteristic for the organization to address. Researchers have found 
that middle class immigrant minorities confront unique difficulties 
regarding social mobility and public support in that discrimination can 
be experienced from both the dominant culture and the low-income 
groups of their same ethnicity.47 Many talked about the Somali refu-
gees who arrived later and who are currently trapped in the welfare 
system. Using Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, the organization is 
partially a reproduction of the Somali cultural habitus. Because the 
majority of the parents of students interviewed were educated and had 
higher status within the Somali hierarchy, the children have partially 
inherited certain cultural orientations from their upbringing, includ-
ing socioeconomic mobility.48 The student informants, while having 
their reservations about employment discrimination, did have confi-
dence that they would be able to find work in the Netherlands in the 
future. When speaking about the organization and civic opportunities 
Macalester International  Vol. 22
268
for Somalis, one student said, “I just know we’re in this together.” 
By developing a network of middle- and upper-middle class Somalis 
throughout the Netherlands and the rest of Europe, the organization 
builds social solidarity to improve confidence and ultimately fight dis-
crimination.
3. Reclaiming Islam
The Somali organization also works to assist the young adults in learn-
ing to battle misrepresentations of Muslims and to integrate Islam 
meaningfully into their daily lives. In current Dutch society, Islamic 
communities increasingly suffer from media and neo-conservative 
attacks, which emphasize the alleged incompatibility of Islam and the 
liberal Dutch lifestyle and Enlightenment values. Many public discus-
sions are mirroring arguments within Huntington’s “Clash of Civili-
zations” theory, characterizing Islam as a threat to Western forms of 
democracy, particularly the separation of church and state. To sup-
port these claims, evidence is taken from sporadic acts of violence 
committed by Muslims, some of whom are Islamic extremists. When 
asked about their reactions to anti-Muslim propaganda, such as Geert 
Wilders’ new film Fitna, two Somalis commented that perhaps what 
is most offensive is that the attacks are always quite obviously refer-
ring to Moroccan incidents that are generalized to be “Islamic” acts of 
violence. Shadid remarks that, “statements made in this context [by 
right-wing politicians and leaders] are mainly of a generalizing and 
disparaging nature, ignoring social, economic, religious, political, and 
ethnic differentiations.”49
In light of these generalizations, Somali youth are encouraged by 
the organization to reconstruct this sense of otherness through learn-
ing about the Islamic faith, in and of itself as well as in conjunction 
with their Somali culture. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, 
the organization inspires the youth to integrate Islam into their lives in 
a manner that is relevant to their current realities. Somalis who grew 
up in the Netherlands generally struggle with both Dutch represen-
tations of Islam as well as their parents’ practice of their faith. The 
Somali organization helps the young adults tease apart false represen-
tations of Islam as well as uses discussions to foster a comprehension 
of Islam in a contemporary European context. Many gain a critical 
understanding of the public commentaries about Islam. One student 
said, “they [the Dutch public] are right about Islam if they’re looking 
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at certain interpretations, those interpretations are just not what we are 
practicing.” Through discussions, the students become deeply familiar 
with the Qur’an and effectively sculpt a personal understanding of 
Islamic faith that differs from their parents. “My Islam is not the Islam 
of my parents,” one said. “Theirs is out of habit, tradition—I know 
much more about actual Islam.” Reevaluating what it means to be a 
Muslim is part of a critical process of self-conceptualization, including 
the development of knowledge and the understanding of one’s envi-
ronment. Muslim-wide student groups take this a step further, using 
Islam as a chance to understand the local environment and to globalize 
a commitment to Islam through encouraging “a global Ummah,” where 
belonging is fostered among the entire Islamic community—from the 
local to the global. While none of the Somalis say they are “true” 
practicing Muslims in that they do not pray four times a day, they all 
consider Islam an extremely important facet of their lives. Several girls 
mentioned that while they didn’t feel as though they have to marry a 
Somali male, it is necessary that they marry a Muslim. The organiza-
tion fosters an environment in which the young adults collaboratively 
learn to appreciate Islam as part of their Somali culture, as well as to 
enliven the religious tradition in an individually appropriate manner.
V. Solidarity in a Global Age
Globalization is a conversation between universals and particulars. 
While the bulk of this essay is an analysis of two cultural particulars 
and their experiences of cultivating ethnic cohesion and belonging, it 
behooves the ethnographer to glean from the case studies implications 
for the wider society. In this section, I elucidate the lessons that this 
research has taught me.
At the core of every intellectual journey are life’s ontological ques-
tions. In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, he proposes three such ques-
tions: what can I know, what ought I to do, and what may I hope 
for? This section is divided into three components, each providing a 
response to the respective question.
A. What can I know?
These case studies illuminated to me that in areas plagued by ethnic 
tensions, the cultivation of solidarity is necessary for successful civic 
engagement. The flute bands and the Somali organization as vehicles 
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of social capital fulfill the needs of belonging and security, and provide 
channels to express ethnic history and identity. By doing so these orga-
nizations encourage youth to participate in their communities in more 
meaningful ways. Their activities illustrate how “individual’s ethnic 
minority background is used as a resource, as a means to engage in 
civic activity, rather than as a path to…passivity.”50 Forms of global-
ization have allowed the bands and the organization to engage youth 
with their wider communities. For example, using the Internet and 
having access to cheaper and easier forms of travel and communica-
tion have facilitated contact and deeper relationships to places out-
side of one’s own locality, to places across the region, the European 
continent, or even to areas further away, such as Somalia. As “single 
identity movements” (versus those emphasizing cross-cultural inte-
gration), the bands and Somali organization work to develop positive 
intra-community identities and values.51 These organizations within 
the Protestant and Somali communities form a coherent identity narra-
tive, linking the past, present, and future. In a globalized world, how 
identity is used, cultivated, and shared will affect dramatically how 
one takes part in local and global society.
B. What ought I to do?
The formation of a European, or even a global, solidarity requires the 
active expansion of local forms of solidarity. Too often solidarity is 
assumed as part of our “essential humanity,” “something within each 
of us…which resonates to the presence of this same thing in other 
human beings.”52 However, ethnic cohesion is a result of an interactive 
process that supports a positive identity, builds networks, and pro-
vides responses to distinct socioeconomic, cultural, and political cir-
cumstances. To construct a wider form of solidarity, there needs to be 
(1) recognition of how cohesiveness works on community levels, and 
(2) encouragement of “everyday democratizations.”53 The first point 
speaks to the importance of actively constructing a wider solidarity 
(e.g., European or global) by building on existing local sentiments. 
The philosopher Richard Rorty significantly notes that, “our sense of 
solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed 
are thought of as ‘one of us,’ where ‘us’ means something smaller and 
more local than the human race.”54 Thus, a rooted understanding of 
solidarity, which already has the culturally responsive mechanisms 
needed for its existence, can be used to allow for a more global cohe-
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sion and empathy. Local organizations are thus significant in helping 
“to affirm and develop cultural confidence [which thus leads to] an 
acceptance of cultural diversity.”55
The second point implies that in order for an expanded solidarity to 
exist, democratic institutions must address the processes of exclusion 
that plague ethnic communities. It would be unjust not to recognize 
that a clear hindrance to their full civic participation in their at-large 
regions is their marginalized positions. Giddens points out that while 
there needs to be the foundational elements of care, civility, and local 
integration, a European solidarity will have to include mechanisms of 
“everyday democratization.”56 Defined as “the advance of substantive 
freedoms in everyday life,” everyday democratization speaks to the 
need for citizens to feel that macro-democratic institutions are address-
ing their needs on a regular basis.57 Young citizens of both the Prot-
estant and Somali communities expressed disenchantment with their 
political representation. “I don’t know if I can ever vote again; I always 
am left feeling betrayed,” said one Shankill youth. A Somali male, 
after talking about Wilders, wondered whether he should stay in the 
Netherlands if the political system was not going to accept him. These 
democratic deficits cannot be ignored when attempting to construct 
solidarity.58
C. What can I hope for?
These ethnographic cases and subsequent discussions raise this ques-
tion: is cosmopolitanism relevant, and can it be developed by these 
organizations? Often described as a “chic lifestyle choice exercised by 
a small international elite group,” cosmopolitanism is perceived by 
many as an idealistic and privileged disposition.59 Accepting that there 
are theoretical dilemmas involved with the philosophy, nonetheless, 
the existing challenges of sectarianism and ethnic tensions illuminate 
the growing necessity for a cosmopolitan framework. While a senti-
ment of solidarity is an element of cosmopolitanism, there must be an 
extra step, that of critical adaptation. Amin refers to the principle of 
“mutuality as the basis of identification and belonging.”60 On the one 
hand, critical adaptation necessitates a level of self-criticism, and, on 
the other, an openness to critiquing others. This “active engagement 
with, and negotiation of, difference” negates simplistic views of alle-
giance, and makes room for the dynamic nature of human identity.61 If 
local organizations can encourage a simultaneous celebration and cri-
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tique of one’s particularities, then a universal framework of empathy, 
solidarity, and responsibility can follow.
VI. Conclusion
Ethnography is always a personal endeavor. This article scrutinized 
the experience of ethnic cohesion in youth communities in Northern 
Ireland and the Netherlands. The research process itself explored the 
intimacies of belonging. Margaret Mead once wrote, “to what past, 
present, or future can the idealistic young commit themselves?”62 This 
research project has led me to conclude that a commitment to cosmo-
politanism is more necessary than ever. However, in the precognitive 
moment of thinking about globalization and cosmopolitanism, there 
is home. As a young adult myself, I realized that investing myself in 
another community required reflections of where I had come from, 
of places and people to whom I belong. We as youth can be either 
pallbearers or gardeners—using tradition to de-legitimize and neglect 
our communities or sowing the seeds for the development of struc-
tures that positively build our communities and our identities. Ulti-
mately, youth have a responsibility to work toward creating a global 
consciousness that rises above the static and singularizing forces of 
sectarianism.
This effort, however, has to be partly rooted in locality. We young 
people must commit ourselves to cosmopolitanism and the critical 
adaptation of otherness, but we must also commit ourselves to our 
home. Gradually, as we inquire, endeavor to understand, and invest 
ourselves in the hopes and plights of others, our understanding of 
home expands. Portions of myself now belong in Northern Ireland and 
the Netherlands, and have become part of what I consider home. In 
our world today, as globalization accelerates, we need to challenge our-
selves to believe in the complexities of our reality, in a sense of home. 
We also need to move beyond our own “peace walls” and believe in 
possibility. •
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physically, and emotionally, at levels unprecedented in my life. I have 
all the words in the world to say to them and yet I am left speechless. 
This essay is for those who helped bear witness to a world with me. 
On the island: Garret, Kyle, Merri, Sarah S., Sarah Z., Janine, Melissa, 
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Emily, and Colin. In the crown jewel: Jack, Anne, Kabir, Liora, Hye 
Won, Jalene, Andra, Federico, and Urvashi. Europe, the world, and 
home will never be the same.
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